State of Utah v. Leleae : Unknown by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
State of Utah v. Leleae : Unknown
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorneys for Appellee; .
Robert K. Heineman; Lisa J. Remal; Attorneys For Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, State of Utah v. Leleae, No. 980189 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1468
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION  C 
F. John Hill 
Director 
Board of Trustees 
Jimi Mitsunaga 
Chairman 
D. Gilbert Athay 
David M. Bown 
Solomon Chacon 
Ronald Coleman 
Maria S. Farrington 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
Lionel H. Frankel 
J. Rand Hirschi 
Grant H. Palmer 
Michael J. Peterson 
424 EAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801)532-5444 
FAX (801 )532-0330 
FAX (801) 595-8213 
C^dtahthked in 1965 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAR 1 8 1999 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
March 17, 1999 
Ms. Julia D'Alesandro 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State, 5th Floor 
P. 0. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Dear Ms. D'Alesandro: 




Pursuant to Rule 24(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I 
am submitting State v. Lopes, Case No. 960551-SC (Utah March 16, 
1999), in support of Point IV of Appellant's opening brief in the 
above-referenced case. The reversal that Lopes seems to require 
would also render Point V of the brief moot. I have attached a 
copy of the opinion to this letter. 
I appreciate your distribution of this letter to the members 
of the Court. 
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Robert K. Heineman 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No. 960551 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v, 
F I L E D 
Cameron Thomas Lopes, 
Defendant and Appellant. March 16, 1999 
Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
Attorneys: Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff 
Linda M. Jones, Michael A. Peterson, 
Kimberly A. Clark, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
ZIMMERMAN^ Justice: 
11 Cameron Thomas Lopes appeals from a judgment and 
conviction for murder, a first degree felony, and enhanced 
sentences imposed by the district court pursuant to sections 7 6-
3-203(1) and -203.1 of the Utah Code. Lopes asks this court to 
reverse the group criminal activity enhancement on the basis that 
section 76-3-203.1 violates both the federal and Utah 
constitutions. We hold that the application of section 7 6-3-
203.1 in this case did deprive Lopes of certain fundamental 
constitutional rights. Furthermore, we hold subsection (5)(c) of 
section 76-3-203.1 violates the Utah Constitution. We, 
therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial. 
12 In March of 1996, the State charged Lopes and several 
other individuals with murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of section 7 6-5-203 of the Utah Code. The information 
alleged that early in the morning of February 22, 1996, Lopes, 
along with three other persons who were parties to the offense, 
went to the residence of Jimmy DeHerrera with the intent to kill 
the occupants. One of the defendants fired two shots from a .20 
gauge shotgun into an open window. Both shots hit and killed 
Joey Miera, who was asleep on the floor. The information further 
alleged that the defendants shot Miera in retaliation for another 
shooting one week earlier that killed one of the defendants' 
friends. The information also gave notice to Lopes that he was 
subject to enhanced penalties for the use of a firearm, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1998) ("firearm 
enhancement"), and for having acted in concert with two or more 
persons, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) ("group 
criminal activity" or "gang" enhancement) -1 Lopes waived his 
preliminary hearing and agreed to be bound over to the district 
court. 
13 In the district court, Lopes moved to strike the gang 
enhancement as unconstitutional under both the state and federal 
constitutions. The court denied^his motion. Thereafter, he 
pleaded guilty to the homicide offense, with enhancements, in 
exchange for dismissal of charges pending against him in another 
case. Lopes conditioned his plea pursuant to State v. SerV/ 758 
P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).2 Lopes's conditional plea 
preserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of the 
gang enhancement statute. 
14 Thereafter, the trial court issued findings that Lopes 
was subject to an enhanced penalty under section 7 6-3-203.1 and 
entered judgment against him.3 The trial court sentenced Lopes 
1
 Lopes refers to section 76-3-203.1 as the "gang" 
enhancement statute. The State correctly points out in its brief 
that the legislature did not create a "gang" enhancement, 
although the statute is popularly known by that name. We agree 
with the State that referring to the statute as a "group criminal 
activity" enhancement is more accurate than "gang" enhancement. 
Nevertheless, we have previously referred to the statute under 
its commonly known name, see State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 
(Utah 1994), and we will continue to do so for ease of reference. 
2
 The Serv decision, which this court has endorsed, see 
State v. Rivera, 943 P.2d 1344, 1344-45 (Utah 1997); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(i), permits a criminal defendant to plead guilty 
while preserving issues for appeal. In this case, Lopes 
specifically preserved his right to appeal the constitutionality 
of the gang enhancement statute. 
3
 Lopes objected to the first paragraph of the judge's 
findings and conclusions regarding applicability of the gang 
enhancement statute because the judge had suggested that the 
issue was waived. As first written, that paragraph stated: 
(Continued on next page.) 
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to an indeterminate term of five years to life* The court also 
enhanced the sentence under the gang enhancement statute, 
sentencing Lopes to an additional four years to "run 
consecutively and not concurrently with the basic sentence." 
Lopes appeals that order* 
55 Lopes contends that the gang enhancement statute 
creates a separate criminal offense by combining a separate 
mental element—"in concert"—with a criminal act and, therefore, 
for the statute to satisfy state and federal due process 
concerns, the State must prove the elements of the enhancement 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as with any other crime. He also 
asserts that section 76-3-203.1(5)(c) interferes with his right 
to a jury trial, as guaranteed by article I, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution.4 
3
 (Footnote continued.) 
In his Statement of Defendant [sic] executed in 
connection with his entry of guilty plea and in his 
colloquy with the court, the defendant, although 
challenging its constitutionality, acknowledged the 
applicability of the gang enhancement as pleaded by the 
state. 
After objection, the first paragraph was changed to read: 
Defendant admitted that he went with at least two other 
people to Joey Miera's home for the purpose of 
retaliating for a fellow gang member's shooting, and 
with the stated purpose of "[gett]ing the punks." 
By making this modification, the trial court acknowledged 
that Lopes never conceded that all the elements of the 
enhancement statute were satisfied, i.e., that the other 
individuals shared the requisite mental state for murder. This 
means that the issue of the applicable burden of proof is 
squarely before us today. See infra 19. 
4
 Lopes raises a series of other claims. He argues that 
the statute interferes with his fundamental due process rights 
because it denies him his right to a preliminary hearing, which 
article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution guarantees. In 
the alternative, he argues that the statute identifies additional 
elements of the underlying offense that the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decided 
guilt on the predicate crime. And finally, Lopes argues on 
appeal that the statute violates the federal Due Process Clause 
(Continued on next page.) 
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56 A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a 
question of law, which we review for correctness. See State v. 
Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). When addressing such a 
challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we 
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. See 
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 
(Utah 1993); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 
811 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991). 
17 In response to Lopes's argument that in enacting the 
gang enhancement statute, the legislature created a new crime, 
the State notes that the legislature specifically expressed an 
intent that the gang enhancement not be a separate offense. The 
legislature does have broad authority to define crimes and 
prescribe punishments. See State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 263-64 
(Utah 1986); State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994-95 (Utah 1978). 
However, although the legislature specifically stated in the 
statute that it intended section 76-3-203.1 to be an enhancement, 
this is not dispositive as to what the legislature actually did. 
18 The gang enhancement statute provides in part: 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense 
listed in Subsection (4) in concert with two 
or more persons is subject to an enhanced 
penalty for the offense as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more 
persons" as used in this section means the 
defendant and two or more other persons would 
be criminally liable for the offense as 
parties under Section 76-2-202. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1) (a) & (b) (1995) (emphasis added). 
Section 76-2-202, referred to in section 76-3-203.1(1) (b), states 
that a person who acts "with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense," and either "directly commits the 
offense, [or] solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
4
 (Footnote continued.) 
because it is vague and overly broad and that it violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the 
uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution. 
Because we decide this case based on the fundamental rights 
arguments in the text, we do not need to address these additional 
constitutional challenges. 
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constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct." Id. § 7 6-2-202. In summary, section 7 6-3-
203.1(1) (a) requires that all three actors must (i) have 
possessed a mental state sufficient to commit the same underlying 
offense and (ii) have directly committed the underlying offense 
or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally 
aided one of the other two actors to engage in conduct 
constituting the underlying offense. At a minimum, under the 
statute, the State must prove that all three actors are guilty of 
":iding and abetting." This was the effective holding of our 
decisions in State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996) ("Labrum 
I") and State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994). In Labrum I, 
we made it clear that "in concert" under the gang enhancement 
statute means that the defendant acted with at least two other 
people and "that those other persons must also be liable for the 
underlying offense." Id. at 940; see also California v. Zermeno, 
61 Cal. App. 4th 623, 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
statute imposing enhanced sentence upon showing of "pattern of 
criminal gang activity" required State to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that at least one^  other actor was guilty of 
"aiding and abetting" defendant). 
59 This leads us to the burden of proof issue. In Labrum 
1/ we did not address the burden of proof by which the State must 
prove the "in concert" element of the gang enhancement statute, 
but the court of appeals did address that question in a 
subsequent appeal. In Labrum I, we stated that before imposing 
the gang enhancement, the statute required "the sentencing judge 
[-c] make discrete . . . findings" that are "indispensable to the 
gang enhancement statute because they establish the legal basis 
that justifies imposition of the prescribed penalty." Labrum 1/ 
925 P.2d at 940. We remanded Labrum I for further proceedings 
because "no specific finding was entered with respect to the 
complicity of the other two persons who accompanied Labrum." Id. 
a": 941. On remand, the trial court made factual findings 
regarding the other two actors' participation and then enhanced 
Labrum's sentence. See State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) ("Labrum II"). Labrum again appealed. 
510 Before the court of appeals, Labrum argued that the 
sentencing court's findings were legally insufficient to fix 
accomplice liability. Labrum premised his argument on both the 
language of the statute and due process. The court of appeals 
reversed the enhancement on grounds that the findings were 
insufficient. It did not address the constitutional question; 
instead, it held: 
Under this statute, it is not enough that 
others were present when the crime was 
committed. Rather, the quality of their 
5 No. 960551 
involvement must rise to the level of 
participation described in section 76-2-202, 
• • • 
Id. at 124. The court of appeals then went on to say that all 
three actors "must possess a sufficiently culpable mental state, 
and the prosecution must prove the foregoing beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id. (emphasis added). Because the court of appeals 
appeared to rely on statutory interpretation to fix the burden of 
proof, it had no occasion to address Labrum's constitutional 
challenges.5 
511 Today, Lopes presents to this court a challenge to the 
gang enhancement statute that is essentially identical to the one 
passed upon by the court of appeals in Labrum II. He contends 
that the State must prove all the elements of accomplice 
liability, including the mental state, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We agree with Lopes and conclude that the statutory "enhancement" 
requires proof of the other actors' criminal culpability, and 
that the State must prove their criminal culpability beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This conclusion finds support in our decision 
in State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978). 
112 In Angus, the defendant was charged with aggravated 
assault, and the State sought a firearm enhancement. The 
defendant argued that the firearm enhancement statute created a 
separate offense that the State had to plead as a separate crime, 
not as an enhancement. This court disagreed. See id. at 994. 
In rejecting the claim of a separate crime that had to be 
separately charged, we said: "When the matter is looked at 
correctly and realistically, it is seen that there is but one 
criminal act charged, but describing it accurately brings it 
within the higher penalty prescribed by law: to-wit, an 
aggravated assault which was committed with a firearm." Id. at 
994 (footnote omitted). Angus acknowledged that the legislature 
has the prerogative "to prescribe the punishment for crimes'7 and 
thereby may "increase the degree of crime." Id. We said that 
the legislature, by enacting the firearm enhancement, had 
increased the degree of the crime by establishing a separate set 
of elements that, if proven, warranted a higher punishment. 
Importantly for present purposes, we concluded in Angus that 
while the State did not need to separately charge the enhancement 
as a crime, it did need to prove each element, including the 
defendant's use of a firearm, beyond a reasonable doubt because 
5
 The court of appeals decided Labrum II after oral 
argument in the present case. Pursuant to rule 24(h) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Lopes notified this court of the 
Labrum II decision. 
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the crime was increased a s tc ciegree b\f t: 1 ie i: i:esence c f 11 :i e 
firearm. See id. at 995. 
5:j Returning to the present case, as both a state and 
federal constitutional matter, we conclude that due process 
requires that the prosecution prove every element of the charged 
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. See Utah Const, art. I, § 7; 
U.S. Const, amend. V, XIV; see also State v. Herrera/ 8 95 P.2d 
359, 368 (Utah 1995}("due process mandates that the prosecution 
prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable 
doubt."); State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) 
(holding that State has burden of proving all elements of a 
crime) : State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981) PA 
fundamental precept of our criminal law is that the state must 
prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
114 Furthermore, and independently, as a statutory matter, 
the Code requires that the State prove each element of the 
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Utah Code Ann. § 
7 6-1-501 (1995) (requiring that each "element of the offense 
charged" be "proved beyond a reasonable doubt," including "[t]he 
conduct, attendant circumstances," and "[tjhe culpable mental 
state required."). 
115 When the legislature passed the gang enhancement 
provision, it acted just as it did when it passed the firearm 
enhancement provision: it mandated imposition of an enhancement 
only upon proof of elements over and above those required for the 
crime of lesser consequence. In essence, it created a specific 
new crime or a crime of a higher degree. As such, each of the 
elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, they 
were not. Therefore, we find the trial court's imposition of the 
gang enhancement to have been in error. 
116 Finally, we turn to Lopes's assertion that the gang 
enhancement statute interferes with his right to a jury trial. 
He argues that since the statute creates a separate and new 
offense, each element must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by 
a jury, not the trial judge. We agree. The Utah Constitution 
provides "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. In criminal jury trials, questions of 
fact and the weight of evidence are to be decided by the jury, 
absent waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 (1995); State v. 
Green, 78 Utah 580, 589-90, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931) ("It is the 
sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in 
all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the state is 
weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted./') 
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517 The gang enhancement statute, section 76-3-
203.1(5)(c), provides: 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury 
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced 
penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the 
sentencing judge that this section is applicable. 
In conjunction with sentencing the court shall 
enter written findings of fact concerning the 
applicability of this section. 
This section of the enhancement statute directs the judge to 
become the fact finder, expressly taking that power away from the 
jury. In this case, the judge followed the statute and became 
the fact finder. Even though Lopes pled guilty to the underlying 
offense, his plea did not establish the requisite mental state of 
the other actors, as is necessary to support imposition of the 
gang enhancement. His plea, then, • did not establish all of the 
elements of the enhancement offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The trial judge supplemented the plea by making the factual 
finding that the elements of the gang enhancement were 
established, and implemented the enhancement. This clearly 
violated article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution because, 
absent waiver, only a jury has the ability to determine when 
elements of a crime are established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Therefore, we find subsection (5)(c) of § 76-3-203.1 of the Code 
unconstitutional. 
118 Having held subsection (5)(c) unconstitutional, we now 
determine if the remainder of the gang enhancement statute can 
remain in effect. The general rule is "that statutes, where 
possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their 
constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion of the statute 
might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional, 
such should be done." Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982). This basic rule applies 
to criminal and civil statutes equally. See State v. Nielsen/ 19 
Utah 2d 66, 69, 426 P.2d 13, 15 (1967) (court severed 
unconstitutional section of criminal statute); State v. Green, 
793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that basic rule 
[of severing unconstitutional provision] applies to the 
construction of criminal statutes). 
119 To determine if a statute is severable from its 
unconstitutional subsection, we look to legislative intent. If 
the intent is not expressly stated, we then turn to the statute 
itself, and examine the remaining constitutional portion of the 
statute in relation to the stricken portion. If the remainder of 
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the statute is operable and still furthers the intended 
legislative purpose, the statute will be allowed to stand. See 
Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 423, 211 P.2d 190, 193 
(1949), quoted in Stewart v. Utah Pub, Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 
759, 779-80 (Utah 1994) . 
120 The criminal code contains a separability clause, but 
it does not aid us in this situation.6 Furthermore, since there 
is no express intent on the severability question in the gang 
enhancement statute, we examine the statute itself to determine 
if severing section 76-3-203.1(5)(c) will destroy the purpose of 
the statute. A close reading of 76-3-203.1 indicates that 
severing subsection (5)(c) will not make the objective of the 
statute unconstitutional.7 The statute imposes higher penalties 
if a person commits certain offenses "in concert with two or more 
persons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1) (1995). It makes no 
difference in the application of the statute or the satisfaction 
of its purposes if the trial judge is the fact finder or if the 
questions of fact are left to the jury. We therefore find the 
remaining portion of the gang enhancement statute constitutional. 
S21 We address the proper course of further proceedings in 
this case. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the gang 
enhancement charge. Our remand does not place the defendant in 
double jeopardy, because the failure to prove an essential 
element of the gang enhancement charge was "trial error." See 
6
 Section 76-1-108 states: "If any provision of this act, 
or.the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this act shall 
not be affected thereby.'7 Although we have never interpreted 
this provision in the past, we now find that the only purpose of 
this section is to preserve the entire criminal code in case any 
one provision is declared unconstitutional. On its face, it does 
not give any direction in this circumstance, where we are trying 
to determine the severability of one subsection from a larger 
section. 
7
 Section 76-3-203.2 of the Utah Code, which imposes 
enhanced penalties for the use of dangerous weapons in offenses 
committed on school premises, is almost identical in structure to 
the gang enhancement statute. A key difference is that section 
7 6-3-203.2 does not include a section making the judge the fact 
finder in a particular case. It seems clear that holding 
subsection (5)(c) of the gang enhancement statute invalid as 
unconstitutional will not frustrate the legislative purpose of 
the statute, as section 76-3-203.2 operates without making the 
trial judge the fact finder. 
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State v. Hiqqenbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 550-51 (Utah 1996) (decision 
was reversed and remanded due to failure to prove an essential 
element of the charge). It was not the fault of the prosecution 
that all elements of the gang enhancement statute were not 
satisfied. Until this decision, no one had notice that the 
enhancement statute requires proof#of all elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or that this determination could not be made by 
a judge absent a waiver of the right to a jury trial. Therefore, 
the State should not be denied the right to a fair adjudication 
because of double jeopardy. See State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 
347 (Utah 1980) (xxThe state and the accused share the right to a 
fair, error-free determination of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused, and the double jeopardy clause may not deny either side 
that right."). 
522 We hold that the gang enhancement statute creates a new 
and separate offense and, therefore, the Code requires each 
element of this crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Since 
the elements of the crime were not established against Lopes, 
either by his plea or by a jury trial, he was deprived of his due 
process- rights as guaranteed by the federal and Utah 
constitutions. Furthermore, subsection (5)(c) of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.1 is found to violate a^defendant's right to a jury 
trial as established in the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
We reverse and remand for a new trial on the section 7 6-3-203.1 
charge. 
123 Associate Chief Justice Durham and Justice Stewart 
concur in Justice Zimmerman7s opinion. 
RUSSON, Justice/ dissenting: 
524 I dissent. In my opinion, the gang enhancement statute 
is simply a sentencing statute. It does not create a separate 
offense with a separate penalty, nor does it add elements to the 
underlying offense. Rather, it merely enhances the minimum 
sentence for the underlying offense once the accused has been 
found guilty of that offense; the maximum sentence remains the 
same regardless of whether the enhancement applies. In fact, the 
statute specifically states, "This section does not create any 
separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary 
offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5)(a) (1995). 
125 As a general principle, the legislature has broad 
authority to define crimes and corresponding punishments, and its 
No. 960551 10 
decision in this regard should not be proscribed unless it 
offends some fundamental principle of justice. See McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1986); see also State v. Angus, 
581 P.2d 992, 994-95 (Utah 1978) ("It is the prerogative of the 
legislature to prescribe the punishment for crimes.") . With 
respect to Utah's firearm and gang enhancement statutes, this 
court has recognized and upheld the legislature's authority to 
require a trial judge to enhance a defendant's statutory minimum 
sentence if certain requirements are met during the sentencing 
phase. Seer e.g.. State v. Alvarez, 872 E , -'el 450, 461 (Utah 
1994) (affirming trial court's imposition of enhanced minimum 
sentence under section 76-3-203.1 upon court's finding that 
defendant committed underlying offense "in concert" with others); 
State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 434-35 (Utah 1993) (affirming trial 
court's imposition of enhanced minimum sentence under section 
76-3-203 for use of firearm during commission of offense); Angus, 
581 P.2d at 995 (same). 
12 6 Notably, wxth respect to the tirearm ennancement 
statute, we have consistently held that the statute does not 
create a separate, additional penalty for the underlying offense; 
it merely "enhances" the minimum sentence. For example, in 
Angus, after the defendant had been convicted of aggravated 
assault, the trial court imposed an enhanced minimum sentence 
pursuant to the firearm enhancement statute. See 581 P.2d at 
993. Rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute created 
a separate offense which must be charged separately, we stated: 
The punishment for a crime is not and has 
never been considered a part of the pleading 
charging a crime. After conviction 
the penalty to be imposed is an entirely 
separate proposition to be determined by the 
court as a matter of law. on the basis of the 
penalty prescribed by the statutes, 
Angus, 581 P.2d at 995. 
1^/ More recently, in Deli, we affirmed a firearm 
enhancement imposed after the defendant was convicted of a number 
of crimes, including murder. Once again, we emphasized that the 
enhancement penalties of the firearm enhancement statute are not 
separate sentences; instead, "the legislature intended the 
penalty for using a firearm in the commission of a felony to 
simply *increaser or ^enhance' the original sentence imposed, net 
to stand alone as a separate sentence." Deli/ 861 P.2d at 434. 
528 In Alvarez, we upheld an enhanced penalty imposed 
pursuant to the gang enhancement statute, see 872 P,2d at 461-t)w* 
ii No. 960551 
however, in that case we did not address whether section 
76-3-203.1 creates a separate offense with a separate penalty- I 
would hold that it does not. Before a defendant is subject to an 
enhanced penalty under either the firearm or the gang enhancement 
statute, the defendant first must be convicted of an underlying 
offense.1 Thereafter, the sentencing judge must impose an 
"indeterminate" sentence prescribed by statute.2 While the judge 
ordinarily has the power to suspend the defendant's sentence,3 
under the firearm and gang enhancement statutes the judge must 
enhance the minimum sentence for the underlying offense if 
certain requirements are met. Thus, the gang enhancement statute 
operates in exactly the same manner as the firearm enhancement 
statute—that is, it merely increases the minimum sentence which 
the legislature has prescribed for the underlying offense. It 
does not affect the maximum sentence. 
229 The majority opinion holds that the "in concert" 
requirement defined in section 76-3-203.1 creates a separate 
offense because it combines a separate mens rea—i.e., "in 
concert" mental culpability—with a criminal act. This reasoning 
is flawed. While a defendant may be charged with a crime and 
held accountable as an accomplice under section 76-2-202,4 the 
1
 The underlying offenses are enumerated in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.1(4) and include crimes such as murder, rape, 
kidnapping and robbery. 
2
 Under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, the 
sentencing judge must impose a sentence and judgment of 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term "of not less than the 
minimum and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law for 
the particular crime." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-4(2). Unless 
otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence "shall 
continue until the maximum period has been reached unless sooner 
terminated or commuted by authority of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole." Id. § 77-18-4(3); see also Padilla v. Board of Pardons, 
947 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1997) ("By its very term, the 
xindeterminate' sentence shall continue until the maximum period 
expires unless the Board, in its discretion, terminates or 
commutes the punishment or pardons the offender."). Under 
section 77-27-9(1)(b) (Supp. 1998), the Board of Pardons and 
Parole may release an offender before the minimum term has been 
served if mitigating circumstances justify the release. 
3
 See. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1998). 
4
 See State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977) 
(Continued on next page.) 
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mere fact that a statute may operate to impose criminal liability 
does not preclude its use as a sentencing factor, so long as its 
use in sentencing does not carry a separate or additional 
penalty. Like the firearm enhancement statute, the gang 
enhancement statute does not impose an additional or separate 
penalty upon the judge's finding that the defendant would be 
criminally liable under that statute; it simply enhances the • 
minimum sentence, 
130 The mere fact that the statute requires the judge to 
make a certain finding before imposing a sentence does not make 
that finding an additional element of the predicate offense. For 
instance, in connection with sentencing, a judge is called upon 
to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, and those factors do 
not thereby become additional elements of the underlying offense: 
In all cases where an indeterminate sentence 
is imposed, the judge imposing the sentence 
may . . . mail to the [Board of Pardons and 
Parole] any information he may have 
regarding the character pf the offender or 
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
connected with the offense for which the 
offender has been convicted. ' 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (a) (Supp. 1998); see also id. '• 
§ 76-3-201(6) (a) (Supp. 1998) ("If a statute under which the 
defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated minimum 
terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the 
term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime."); id. § 76-3-201(6)(c) 
(Supp. 1998) ("In determining whether there are circumstances 
that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court 
may consider statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further 
evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing."). 
131 Furthermore, in considering the pertinent sentencing 
factors, judges sometimes must take into account the defendant's 
4
 (Footnote continued.) 
(explaining that accomplice is one who participates in crime in 
such a way that he could be charged with same offense as the 
principal defendant); State v. Murphy, 489 P.2d 430, 431 (1971) 
(concluding that defendant who drove co-defendant to store that 
was robbed, waited in car with engine running, and then drove co-
defendant to another car one block away after co-defendant had 
allegedly killed store owner was "principal") . 
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mental state. For example, the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration requires judges to "[c]onsider [the following] 
aggravating circumstances only if they are not an element of the 
offense, . . . 5. Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty 
or depravity. . . . 7. Offender's attitude is not conducive to 
supervision in a less restrictive setting." Utah Code of 
Judicial Admin, app. C, at 1297 (1998); accord id. app. D, at 
1368 (authorizing presentence investigator to consider whether 
crime was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity)/ id. at 
1371 (same). Thus, weighing the defendant's state of mind is 
well within the realm of a sentencing judge's authority. 
132 Moreover, acting with "in concert" mental culpability 
is not identified as an element of any of the enumerated felonies 
in the gang enhancement statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-3-
203.1(4). In fact, under the statute, a sentencing judge does 
not even inquire into the defendant's mental state until after 
the defendant has been duly convicted of an enumerated felony. 
133 The United States Supreme Court's decision in McMillan 
v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986), is instructive. That 
case involved a constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania 
sentencing statute, which provides that anyone convicted of 
certain enumerated felonies is subject to a mandatory minimum 
sentence of five years' imprisonment if the sentencing judge 
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant 
"visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the 
offense. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81. Recognizing that states have 
broad authority to define crimes and prescribe penalties, the 
Court observed that 
the Pennsylvania Legislature has expressly 
provided that visible possession of a firearm 
is not an element of the crimes enumerated in 
the mandatory sentencing statute . . . but 
instead is a sentencing factor that comes 
into play only after the defendant has been 
found guilty of one of those crimes beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 85-86. 
134 In upholding the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania 
statute, the McMillan Court reasoned that (1) the enhancement 
implied no presumption of guilt, nor was the prosecution relieved 
of its burden of proving the defendant guilty of an enumerated 
offense, see id. at 87/ (2) the enhancement did not extend the 
period of incarceration beyond the terms provided for any of the 
enumerated felonies to which it applied, nor did it create a 
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separate offense calling for a separate penalty, but rather 
merely limited the trial court's sentencing discretion in 
selecting a penalty within the range already available to it, see 
id. at 87-88; (3) "[t]he statute [gave] no impression of having 
been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a 
tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense," i.e., the 
argument that the enhancement was really an element of the 
offense lacked even superficial appeal because it did not expose 
the defendant to greater or additional punishment, see id. at 88; 
and (4) the Pennsylvania legislature "did not change the 
definition of any existing offense [but] simply took one factor 
that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on 
punishment—the instrumentality used in committing a violent 
felony—and dictated the precise weight to be given that factor, 
id. at 89-90." 
In conclusion, the Court stated: 
Sentencing courts have traditionally heard 
evidence and found facts without any 
prescribed burden of proof at all. 
Sentencing courts necessarily consider 
the circumstances of an offense in selecting 
the appropriate punishment, and we have 
consistently approved sentencing schemes that 
mandate consideration of facts related to the 
crime without suggesting that those facts 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 91-92 (citations omitted). 
135 Under McMillan's reasoning, the gang enhancement 
statute at hand is clearly constitutional. First, the Utah 
Legislature expressly chose to make group criminal activity a 
sentencing factor rather than a separate offense. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (5) (a) ("This section does not create any 
separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary 
offense."). This is clear not only from the language of the 
statute, but also because the statute does not impose an 
additional, separate penalty to the penalty for the underlying 
offense. Second, the statute comes into play only after the 
defendant has been duly convicted of violating one of the 
enumerated offenses in section 76-3-203.1(4). The statute 
implies no presumption of guilt, and the prosecution is not 
relieved of its burden of proving each element of an enumerated 
felony. Third, the statute does not expose the defendant to a 
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greater maximum term; it merely increases the minimum sentence 
prescribed by statute for the underlying offense. Thus, the 
statute in no way operates as "a tail which wags the dog of the 
substantive offense." McMillan/ 477 U.S. at 88. Fourth, even if 
the commission of an offense "in concert with two or more 
persons" has not traditionally been a sentencing factor, that 
fact alone should not limit the legislature's authority to 
prescribe an enhanced penalty for such conduct. If the 
legislature has the authority to determine that committing a 
crime while visibly possessing a firearm is a factor that should 
be given precise weight during sentencing, it should also have 
the authority to determine that committing a crime "in concert 
with two or more persons" justifies imposition of an enhanced 
minimum sentence if certain requirements are met.5 
53 6 Finally, I disagree with the majority's description of 
the claimed constitutional right allegedly impinged upon by the 
gang enhancement statute. The majority contends that because the 
statute enhances the minimum sentence on the basis of findings 
concerning the defendant's mental culpability, those findings 
somehow become additional elements of a separate crime. As 
already indicated, I disagree with this premise. More 
disturbing, however, is that from this, the majority extrapolates 
that under both the state and the federal due process clauses, 
the statute violates a criminal defendant's fundamental right to 
be presumed innocent until each element of the offense is proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. While criminal defendants certainly 
have a right to such a presumption of innocence, the majority 
identifies no authority that this right is infringed when a 
sentencing judge makes findings relevant to sentencing without 
the state having to prove those findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Without any articulated constitutional basis, the 
majority simply states that this is required. 
537 In sum, because the gang, enhancement statute creates 
neither a separate crime with a separate penalty nor an 
5
 While Lopes does not question the reasoning upholding the 
Pennsylvania statute in McMillan, he asks this court to 
invalidate the gang enhancement statute, which actually makes it 
more difficult for a judge to enhance a defendant's sentence. 
Under the Pennsylvania statute, the sentencing judge was merely 
required to make a factual finding that the defendant visibly 
possessed a firearm. Under the gang enhancement statute, the 
sentencing judge must make a factual finding and must further 
determine that the defendant possessed the mental state required 
for liability as an accomplice to the underlying offense. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-2-202. 
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additional element to an underlying offense, I would hold that 
Lopes was not denied any fundamental rights. I would affirm. 
138 Chief Justice Howe concurs in Justice Russon's 
dissenting opinion. 
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